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Statutory Construction, Equal Protection,
and the Amendment Process:
On Romer, Hunter, and Efforts to Tame
Baehr
MARK STRASSERt
In Baehr v. Miike, a trial court in Hawaii held that the
state's same-sex marriage ban was not narrowly tailored to pro-
mote compelling state interests and thus violated the state con-
stitution's Equal Protection Clause.' The state supreme court is
expected to af .2 Even if the Hawaii Supreme Court acts as
anticipated; however, the issue of whether same-sex couples will
be allowed to wed their same-sex partners will not be settled,
because the citizens of Hawaii will decide in 1998 whether to
amend their constitution to allow the legislature to limit mar-
riage to opposite-sex couples.
3
Suppose that the Hawaii Supreme Court affirms and that
the citizens of Hawaii vote to amend their state constitution. It
is not at all clear that such an amendment would itself pass fed-
eral constitutional muster. The recent attempt in Colorado to
amend that state's constitution to disadvantage lesbians, bisexu-
als, and gays was struck down in Romer v. Evans,4 and an at-
tempt to amend the Hawaii Constitution may suffer the same
fate. Indeed, there are a number of reasons to believe that the
proposed amendment in Hawaii more clearly violates the federal
constitution than did the amendment at issue in Romer.
t Associate Professor, Capital University Law School.
1. See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996).
2. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflicts of Laws, and the Unconstitu-
tional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1965 (1997) ("We can confidently pre-
dict that Hawaii will recognize same-sex marriages."); Victoria Slind-Flor, Same-Sex
Case Poses Many Questions, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 1996, at As (suggesting that, given the
composition of the Hawaii Supreme Court, it is likely that the lower court decision will
be affirmed).
3. See David Orgon Coolidge, Essay, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miihe and the
Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. TEx L. REv. 1, 17 (1997) (noting an amendment to give legis-
lature power to reserve marriage to same-sex couples on ballot for November 1998).
4. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
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Part I of this Article discusses the Supreme Court jurispru-
dence regarding referenda which are at least arguably aimed at
minorities. The Court has upheld amendments which were
facially neutral, even if disproportionately impacting a minority,
as long as the Court was confident that the amendment was not
intended to disadvantage that minority. However, the Court's
willingness to uphold such referenda should be of small comfort
to those supporting the proposed amendment in Hawaii since it
is not facially neutral and is clearly aimed at a particular
minority.
Part II discusses the deference which the Supreme Court
will give to each state supreme court's interpretation of its own
state's statutes and constitution. The Hawaii Supreme Court
has already construed the same-sex marriage ban as discrimi-
nating on the basis of gender, both facially and as applied. The
proposed amendment in Hawaii will not somehow make the
statutory classification at issue non-gender-based, but instead
will make the admittedly gender-based classification immune
from state constitutional scrutiny. Notwithstanding the newly
acquired immunity from state Equal Protection Clause guaran-
tees, however, the proposed amendment and the legislation it
authorizes would still be subject to federal constitutional scru-
tiny as a gender-based classification.
Part III discusses the federal constitutional guarantees
which would be violated by the proposed amendment in Hawaii.
Because its classification is not closely tailored to promote im-
portant state interests, the proposed amendment does not pass
federal constitutional muster. While it is not yet clear whether
the citizens of Hawaii will choose to pass the proposed amend-
ment, it is clear that the proposed amendment cannot survive
federal constitutional scrutiny.
I. MINORITIES AND THE STATE AMENDMENT PROCESS
An analysis of the proposed amendment in Hawaii requires
an examination of Romer v. Evans,5 both because of that deci-
sion's recency and its content. Yet, to understand Romer's appli-
cability, one must also examine several other decisions involving
proposed amendments to charters or state constitutions which,
at least arguably, were directed at disfavored minorities. The
Court has made clear in numerous decisions that popularly




intentionally pick out disfavored minorities for adverse treat-
ment are unconstitutional.
A. Voting
In various states and localities, voters have attempted to
disadvantage disfavored minorities by making it more difficult
for those groups to get housing, to pass antidiscrimination ordi-
nances, or even to have their votes weigh as heavily as the votes
of others. Sometimes, the proposed amendments would seek to
accomplish more than one goal, for example, both to dilute votes
and to make it more difficult to acquire protection from invidi-
ous discrimination. For example, Romer v. Evans involved an
amendment which would have made it more difficult to use the
political process to pass antidiscrimination laws.
Romer concerned Amendment 2, a proposed amendment to
the Colorado Constitution, which would have withdrawn "from
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the in-
juries caused by discrimination,"6 and which would have forbid-
den "reinstatement of these laws and policies." 7 The Amendment
read,
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or depart-
ments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or
school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, or-
dinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the
basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any mi-
nority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination. 8
Amendment 2 might have been analyzed in terms of its ef-
fect on voting (voters' attempts to pass certain kinds of legisla-
tion would have been thwarted by the amendment) or in terms
of its effect on the ability of a particular group to compete on an
equal playing field with others (the amendment would have pre-
cluded antidiscrimination protection). The former tack has
proven to be quite powerful in a whole series of cases and was
adopted by the Supreme Court of Colorado when it originally
heard Romer.9
6. Id. at 1625.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1623.
9. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 12710, 1276 (en banc) (Colo. 1993) (citing Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 US. 330, 336 (1972)). ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the
fundamental right to participate equally in the political process and... any attempt to
7411997]
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Every citizen has a fundamental right to vote and the Court
will vigilantly protect that right.'0 In Reynolds v. Sims," the
Court held that the Constitution protects the right of all quali-
fied citizens to vote," explaining that "the fundamental principle
of representative government in this country is one of equal rep-
resentation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race,
sex, economic status, or place of residence within a State."3
The factors which the Reynolds Court suggests should be
disregarded-race, sex, economic status, and place of resi-
dence-include some classifications which receive heightened
scrutiny and others which do not.14 This suggests that the im-
portant consideration is the nature of the right at issue (the
right to vote) and not the nature of the group whose rights are
being diluted. After all, the right to vote is a "fundamental mat-
ter" in a democracy.15 Further, especially when one considers
that voting helps to preserve other basic civil and political
rights, any attempts to limit or circumvent the citizen's right to
vote must be "carefully and meticulously scrutinized."16 Thus,
the Reynolds Court suggests that the right to vote is so impor-
tant that the Court must closely examine any attempts to in-
fringe upon that right.
In Reynolds, the Court made clear that it would carefully
scrutinize legislative apportionment schemes when the "rights
allegedly impaired are individual and personal in nature."
17
Those rights might be impaired in a variety of ways. For exam-
ple, a state might provide that the votes of citizens in one part
of the State should be given two, five, or ten times the weight of
infringe on an independently identifiable group's ability to exercise that right is subject
to strict judicial scrutiny").
10. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) ("[Wlhere
fundamental rights and liberties [like the right to vote] are asserted under the Equal
Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely
scrutinized and carefully confined.").
11. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
12. Id. at 554.
13. Id. at 560-61.
14. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race is suspect); see Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976) (employing intermediate scrutiny to determine that gender is quasi-
suspect); see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (eco-
nomic status and location within the state are non-suspect); see also Gray v. Sanders,
372 US. 368, 380 (1963) (suggesting that neither occupation nor homesite are legitimate
bases for distinguishing between qualified voters, but also not suggesting that special
scrutiny is required or even appropriate for that determination).
15. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62.
16. Id. at 562.
17. Id. at 561.
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votes of citizens in another part of the State.'8 Were that to hap-
pen, it could not be denied that the right to vote of those resid-
ing in the disfavored areas had been "effectively diluted,"19 since
it would then be the case that "[t]wo, five, or 10 of them must
vote before the effect of their voting is equivalent to that of their
favored neighbor."20 Yet, it is not necessary for a state to dimin-
ish a vote's effectiveness by 50% or more for the Court to find a
constitutional violation. As the Court pointed out in Washington
v. Seattle School District,21 a system which "more subtly distorts
governmental processes in such a way as to place special bur-
dens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legis-
lation 22 may also be constitutionally infirm. Yet, that is exactly
what was at issue in Romer-the constitutional permissibility of
the placement of special burdens on a minority to achieve bene-
ficial legislation.
Reynolds should not be understood to imply that every vot-
ing system will be subjected to close and careful examination.
On the contrary, the Court indicated otherwise in Gordon v.
Lance.23 In Gordon, the Court considered West Virginia's re-
quirement, "applicable to all bond referenda, by which the
strong consensus of three-fifths is required before indebtedness
is authorized."24 The West Virginia Supreme Court had con-
cluded that the requirement could not pass constitutional mus-
ter because the votes of those favoring the issuance of the bonds
had a proportionately smaller impact on the outcome of the elec-
tion than the votes of those opposing issuance of the bonds.
25
The United States Supreme Court reversed, because the Court
could "discern no independently identifiable group or category
that favors bonded indebtedness over other forms of financing,"
26
and thus could not conclude that a particular "sector of the pop-
ulation may be said to be 'fenced out' from the franchise because
of the way they will vote."27 The Court held that election provi-
sions do not violate the Equal Protection Clause as long as they
do not "discriminate against or authorize discrimination against
18. Id. at 562.
19. Id.
20. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 563.
21. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
22. Id. at 467.
23. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id. at 4.




any identifiable class."2 Thus, the Court will be vigilant to pro-
tect the voting rights of identifiable groups. However, where a
voting system is rationally based and does not pick out a partic-
ular group for adverse treatment, the Court will tend to uphold
the suggested classification.
B. Targeting Minorities
The Gordon Court made clear that a central concern was
whether the voting rules under examination targeted an identi-
fiable class. When the United States Supreme Court considered
the amendment at issue in Romer, the Court was struck by the
amendment's "sheer breadth, [which was] so discontinuous with
the reasons offered for it that the amendment seem[ed] inexplic-
able by anything but animus toward the class that it af-
fect[ed]." 29 The Court pointed out that "singling out a certain
class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general hardships
... [should be] rare,"30 explaining that "by requiring that the
classification bear a rational relationship to an independent and
legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications are not
drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by
the law."31 Yet, it is quite clear that the proposed amendment in
Hawaii is designed to disadvantage a particular group by
preventing them from marrying when they otherwise would be
able to do so.
Whenever a statute disadvantages a traditionally disfavored
group, the Court must determine whether "the disadvantage im-
posed is born of animosity toward the class of persons af-
fected."32 The mere fact that an unpopular group is adversely af-
fected by a statute, even disproportionately, does not establish
the invidiousness of that statute, since different groups can be
affected differently by a particular statute without that statute's
being constitutionally infirm. The Court explained in Kotch v.
Bd. of River Port Pilot Com'rs33 that "it is axiomatic that the
consequence of regulating by setting apart a classified group is
that those in it will be subject to some restrictions or receive
certain advantages that do not apply to other groups or to all
the public."3 The Constitution does not require that the statute
28. Id. at 7.
29. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996).
30. Id. at 1628.
31. Id. at 1627.
32. Id. at 1628.
33. 330 US. 552 (1947).
34. Id. at 556 (citing Atchison, T. & S.FR. Co. v. Matthews, 174 US. 96, 106 (1899)).
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affect every individual equally. In Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney,35 the Court discussed "the settled rule
that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not
equal results."
3 6
Notwithstanding the Court's acceptance of the principle that
equal results are not guaranteed, however, the Court realizes
that some statutorily imposed inequalities are constitutionally
impermissible. For example, a statute which facially discrimi-
nates against racial minorities "can be upheld only upon an ex-
traordinary justification."37 Indeed, even if the statute "is osten-
sibly neutral,"38 it will be held unconstitutional if it "is an
obvious pretext for racial discrimination."39
The Court has made clear that even "a law neutral on its
face still may be unconstitutional if motivated by a discrimina-
tory purpose."40 When a facially neutral statute is attacked on
equal protection grounds, the Court must discern intent.41 The
Loving Court explained that the "Equal Protection Clause re-
quires the consideration of whether the classifications drawn by
any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidious discrimina-
tion."42 If a statute, neutral on its face, is nonetheless invidi-
ously motivated, it will be struck down as violating the protec-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Regrettably, it may be difficult to discern the intent of or
motivation behind a particular statute.4 An individual advocat-
ing the adoption of a particular measure for invidious reasons
will not be "foolish enough to admit what he is doing."" Rather,
he will articulate neutral-sounding reasons to support his posi-
tion and will likely not be so imprudent as to admit his animos-
35. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
36. Id. at 273.
37. Id. at 272 (citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 US. 184 (1964)).
38. Id. (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US. 356 (1886)).
39. Id.
40. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 544 (1982).
41. Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484-85 (1982) ("[W]hen
facially neutral legislation is subjected to equal protection attack, an inquiry into intent
is necessary to determine whether the legislation in some sense was designed to accord
disparate treatment...').
42. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).
43. See generally Mark Strasser, The Invidiousness of Invidiousness: On the Su-
preme Court's Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 21 HASTINGs CONsT. L. Q. 323, 341-43
(1994) (discussing the difference between intention and motivatipn).
44. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367
US. 886, 900 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Strasser, supra note 43 (discussing some
of the difficulties in invidiousness jurisprudence).
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ity towards the group to be adversely affected.45 Further, indi-
viduals may have a variety of intentions and motivations when
supporting a proposition which they know will adversely affect a
group whom they hate. As Justice Marshall pointed out in his
Feeney dissent, "That a legislature seeks to advantage one group
does not, as a matter of logic or of common sense, exclude .the
possibility that it also intends to disadvantage another. Individ-
uals in general and lawmakers in particular frequently act for a
variety of reasons."4 Thus, merely because an individual has a
noninvidious reason to support a particular proposal does not
establish the absence of a stronger, invidious reason to support
that same proposal.
When there are numerous reasons articulated to support a
particular proposal, it will be difficult to discern which are the
"real" reasons. One way to distinguish between real and spe-
cious reasons is to see whether the asserted reasons prompt the
state to adopt practices which adversely affect groups that do
not have a history of having been subjected to discriminatory
practices. If it turns out that allegedly compelling reasons justi-
fying policies adversely affecting disfavored groups are noncom-
pelling or, perhaps, nonexistent when the interests of other
groups are at issue, then there may be reason to doubt that the
asserted reasons are reasons at all.47
Once the "real" reasons are discerned, the Court will still
have to decide whether the predominant motivating factor is in-
vidious. The Feeney Court explained that where an individual or
legislature selects "a particular course of action at least in part
'because of', not merely 'in spite of', its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group,"48 the Court will find that a discriminatory
purpose exists.
When the state of Colorado tried to offer noninvidious justi-
fications for Amendment 2, it cited respect for other citizens'
45. But see Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(chastising the Court for placing "the prestige of this institution behind the proposition
that opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias."); see id.
(implying that the imposition of disadvantages was appropriate because what was in-
volved was a "Kulturkampf" rather than "a fit of spite."); Justice Scalia seems not to ap-
preciate that individuals who promote policies involving racial or religious bias may also
view what they are doing as a culture war rather than a fit of spite. Were that all that
was needed to make policies constitutionally permissible, the entire Fourteenth Amend-
ment equal protection jurisprudence would be rendered worthless.
46. Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 282 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. See infra notes 192-201 and accompanying text (discussing how certain interests
are only classified as compelling when same-sex couples want to marry).
48. Feeney, 442 US. at 279.
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freedom of association and the state's interest in conserving re-
sources to fight discrimination against other groups. 49 However,
the Court found it impossible to credit those as the real rea-
sons.50 Indeed, the Court could not believe that the amendment
had any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective,
51
finding instead that it was "a classification of persons under-
taken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause
does not permit."52 The Romer Court concluded that because
Amendment 2 classified "homosexuals not to further a proper
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else,"
53
the amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause and was
unconstitutional.
54
The Court has suggested that when disfavored groups are
disadvantaged by statutes, whether facially or as applied, those
statutes will be examined to make sure that they are employing
rational means to achieve legitimate ends. The Court will at-
tempt to uncover illicit motivation and will attempt to discern
which classifications constitute invidious discrimination, claims
of innocuous or benign classification notwithstanding.
C. Benign vs. Invidious Classifications
In United States v. Virginia,55 the Court made clear that
claims of benign motivation and intent in defense of "categorical
exclusions" would not be accepted automatically.56 In Adarand
Constructors Ina v. Pena,57 the Court pointed out that it may not
always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign,
58
suggesting that absent strict scrutiny there is no way to deter-
mine which racial classifications are remedial and which are
motivated by illegitimate notions. 59 In Virginia, the Court
49. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629; see also Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and the Kultur-
kampf: Supreme Court Storytelling, the Culture War and Romer v. Evans, 72 NoTRE
DAmE L. REV. 345, 350 (1997) (offering purportedly rational reasons justifying the dis-
crimination). Prof Duncan does not seem to appreciate that these same reasons might
be offered to legitimate discrimination against a variety of racial and religious groups.





55. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
56. Id. at 2277.
57. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
58. Id. at 202.




warned that it would closely examine gender classifications to
make sure that they were not invidious or were not based upon
"overbroad generalizations" about the proper roles of men and
women.
60
Consider Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.6 1 In
Hogan, the Court examined whether the Mississippi University
for Women employed an invidious distinction when it refused to
admit men to its School of Nursing.62 The Court made clear that
the fact that the policy discriminated against males rather than
females did not exempt it from intermediate scrutiny.6 3 Thus,
the Court's decision could perhaps be understood as refusing to
allow invidious discrimination against men.
Yet, much of the opinion involved the question of why a pur-
portedly benign classification was actually invidiously discrimi-
nating against women. The Hogan Court suggested that the ex-
clusive admissions policy tended to "perpetuate the stereotyped
view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job."64 The Court
found that women did not lack opportunities to obtain training
or leadership positions in the field of nursing,65 and suggested
that the effect of MUW's policy might be to depress wages in the
field, thereby "penaliz[ing] the very class the State purports to
benefit."6 Thus, the Court made clear that facial classifications
on the basis of gender, although apparently benign, might well
be invidious and offensive to constitutional guarantees.
67
A state constitutional amendment which explicitly employs
a gender classification will be subjected to close scrutiny to as-
sure that the allegedly benign classification is not invidious.
Further, when the State offers its justification for the classifica-
tion, the Court will seek to assure that the justification is "genu-
ine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litiga-
tion."68 Although it is unclear which justifications will be offered
by the state of Hawaii to establish that its facial gender classifi-
cation prohibiting same-sex marriage is benign and not invidi-
ous, it is doubtful that these "genuine" reasons will survive close
60. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275.
61. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
62. See id. at 719 ('his case presents the narrow issue of whether a state statute
that excludes males from enrolling in a state-supported professional nursing school vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
63. See id. at 723 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 US. 380, 394 (1979)).
64. Id. at 729.
65. Id.
66. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729 n.15.
67. See infra notes 173-287 and accompanying text (discussing Equal Protection).




D. Determining the Relevant Baseline
Even bracketing the issue of whether a particular classifica-
tion will in fact be to the advantage or detriment of a particular
class, the Court has expressed another concern when seeking to
determine the constitutionality of a voter-initiated modification,
namely, determining the baseline from which to judge whether
the change at issue is in fact disadvantageous. Would the reci-
sion of a statute benefiting a group involve disadvantaging that
group or simply putting it back in the position in which it would
have been found before the statute had been passed? As a public
policy matter, it would be counterproductive to say that when-
ever a recision measure puts a traditionally disfavored group in
a worse position than it would have been without that measure,
that group has been disadvantaged in a constitutionally signifi-
cant way.70 Were the Court to adopt such an approach, cities and
states might be encouraged not to provide any protections above
those required by federal law for fear that such protections once
enacted would have to become part of the permanent legal land-
scape.7 1 The Supreme Court has rejected the "contention that
once a State chooses to do 'more' than the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires, it may never recede.7 2
In Romer, one of the questions at hand was whether the
amendment at issue merely repealed or rescinded the antidis-
crimination laws which had already been adopted in Boulder,
Denver, and Aspen.73 The Romer Court denied that the Amend-
ment was a mere recision, pointing out that "Amendment. 2, in
explicit terms, does more than repeal or rescind these provi-
sions. It prohibits all legislative, executive or judicial action at
any level of state or local government designed to protect ...
gays and lesbians."7 4 This analysis may have import for the con-
69. See infra notes 192-210 and accompanying text (discussing reasons allegedly
justifying the same-sex marriage ban).
70. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142'(1971) ("But of course a lawmaking
procedure that 'disadvantages' a particular group does not always deny equal
protection.").
71. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 US. 527, 539 (1982).
72. Id. at 535.
73. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996) (Each of these cities had "en-
acted ordinances which banned discrimination in many transactions and activities, in-
cluding housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and welfare
services.").
74. Id. at 1623; See also Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 483 (1982)
("Initiative 350, however, works something more than the 'mere repeal' of a desegrega-
1997] 749
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stitutionality of the proposed Hawaii amendment, since the citi-
zens of Hawaii will not "simply" be trying to rescind a statute or
local ordinance barring discrimination. Rather, they will be
amending their constitution to limit the applicability of that doc-
ument's Equal Protection Clause.7 5
The proposed amendment in Hawaii suffers from one of the
defects found in Romer, although the manifestation is somewhat
different. In both cases, the kind of legislation subject to popular
vote has been altered, and that alteration is intended to disad-
vantage a disfavored group. In Romer, the amendment would
have deprived voters of the right to enact protective legislation.
In Hawaii, the proposed amendment would give voters the right
to determine through their legislators whether particular indi-
viduals will be allowed to marry, whereas before that amend-
ment's passage (assuming for the sake of argument that it does
pass) the right of same-sex couples to marry would have been
protected by the state constitution and thus not subject to popu-
lar referendum.
The different issues here should not be conflated. One issue
is that constitutional rights will now become subject to the
whims of the legislature, so the level of protection will have
been greatly reduced by the amendment. As a separate matter,
some rights simply should not be subject to popular referendum.
As a federal district court in Ohio pointed out, "one of the most
important roles of the federal courts [is] to ensure that the con-
stitutional rights of the few or the powerless are not infringed
"76
The Hawaii legislature reached a compromise and passed
two bills, one granting "reciprocal beneficiary" benefits, which
would allow same-sex couples to receive many of the benefits
that married couples have, and the other placing a proposed
amendment on the 1998 ballot which would allow the legisla-
ture to reserve marriage for opposite-sex couples.77 At least two
points should be made about this compromise. First, it should be
noted that nothing would preclude the legislature from re-
tion law by the political entity that created it. It burdens all future attempts to inte-
grate Washington schools in districts throughout the State, by lodging decisionmaking
authority over the question at a new and remote level of government.").
75. See infra notes 190-283 and accompanying text (discussing equal protection is-
sues raised by the amendment).
76. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 838 F. Supp.
1235, 1236 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
77. See Bettina Boxall, A New Era Set to Begin in Benefits for Gay Couples, L. A.
TziEs, July 7, 1997, at A3 (describing Hawaiian law which will allow unmarried people
to qualify for benefits typically reserved for married couples).
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scinding the reciprocal beneficiary legislation once the proposed
amendment had passed. Second, the compromise actually under-
cuts the state's position with respect to why the same-sex mar-
riage ban serves a compelling state interest. In Miike, the State
argued that it had a compelling interest in protecting the public
fisc from the reasonably foreseeable effects of the recognition of
same-sex marriages.78 Now, the state is willing to grant a vari-
ety of benefits in exchange for the privilege of reserving mar-
riage for opposite-sex couples. It may well be that the public fisc
argument would not have been successful anyway,7 9 but the
state's "compromise" suggests that the state may not have been
arguing in good faith when suggesting that it had a compelling
interest in preserving the public fisc which justified maintaining
a same-sex marriage ban.
E. Previous Amendment Attempts
Historically, there have been several attempts to modify
state constitutions, city charters, etc., in ways which would have
adversely impacted minorities. The Court has developed a juris-
prudence which explains why some but not all of these attempts
were constitutionally infirm and which suggests that the pro-
posed amendment in Hawaii will not pass constitutional muster.
In Hunter v. Erickson,80 the Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of an amendment to the city charter which provided
that any
ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which regulates
the use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease
or financing of real property of any kind or of any interest therein on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry must first be ap-
proved by a majority of the electors voting on the question at a regular
or general election before said ordinance shall be effective.8'
The Hunter Court held the amendment unconstitutional, hold-
ing that "the State may no more disadvantage any particular
group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its be-
half than it may dilute any person's vote' or give any group a
smaller representation than another of comparable sizef 82 Fur-
78. See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996) at *3.
79. See id. at 16 ("Defendant presented insufficient evidence and failed to establish
or prove any adverse consequences to the public fisc resulting from same-sex marriage).
80. 393 US. 385 (1969).
81. Id. at 387.
82. Id. at 393; see also Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1285 (Colo. 1993) (en banc)
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ther, the Court was not persuaded that this amendment had to
be upheld because it was adopted in a referendum, suggesting
that the fact that "the implementation of this change [was]
through popular referendum [does not] immunize it,"3 since the
"sovereignty of the people is itself subject to ... constitutional
limitationsf84
The Hunter Court considered the law facially neutral in
that it did not facially discriminate against a minority,8 5 but
nonetheless found a constitutional violation, noting that "the re-
ality is that the law's impact falls on the minority."16 The Court
reasoned, "The majority needs no protection against discrimina-
tion and if it did, a referendum might be bothersome but no
more than that."8 7 The proposed amendment in Hawaii is not
facially neutral and will severely impact a disfavored minority.
In Washington v. Seattle School District,88 the Court consid-
ered a statewide initiative providing that no school board could
require any student to attend a school which was not very close
geographically to the student's place of residence. 9 However,
there were several broad exceptions to this requirement.90 Basi-
cally, this initiative was designed to stop the use of mandatory
busing for racial integration purposes,91 although the initiative
did not prevent any court of competent jurisdiction from adjudi-
cating the relevant constitutional issues92 and the initiative did
not mention race or integration anywhere.93 The Court held that
the initiative was "effectively drawn for racial purposes,"94 sup-
porting that conclusion by noting that the District Court had
(citing Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 US. 621, 627 (1969)) ("In short, gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals are left out of the political process through the denial of having
an 'effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives. ").
83. Hunter, 393 US. at 392 (citing Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo.,
377 US. 713, 736-37 (1964)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 391 ("[T]he law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an
identical manner . . . !); See also Teresa M. Bruce, Note, Neither Liberty Nor Justice:
Anti-Gay Initiatives, Political Participation, and the Rule of Law, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POLVY 431, 458-59 (1996) ("[Tihe Court characterized the amendment as facially neutral
86. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
87. Id.
88. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
89. Id. at 462.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 463 (citing WAsH.REv.CODE § 28A.26.060 (1981)).




found that the initiative was "carefully tailored to interfere only
with desegregative busing"95 and by noting the initiative's propo-
nents' claim that the 99% of the school districts in the state-
those lacking mandatory integration programs-would not be af-
fected by the initiative.9 6 Because the initiative was designed to
promote invidious racial purposes, the Court held that it vio-
lated constitutional guarantees.
Washington is helpfully compared to Crawford v. Board of
Education,7 especially considering that the cases were argued
on the same day98 and that the decisions were announced on the
same day.99 In Crawford, the Court decided the constitutionality
of an amendment to the California Constitution which provided
that state courts could not order mandatory pupil assignment or
transportation unless a federal court would do so to remedy a
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection violation. 100 The Su-
preme Court denied that the proposition embodied a racial clas-
sification, since it neither said nor implied that, persons were to
be treated differently on account of their race.101 Thus, the
amendment in Crawford was held to be facially neutral just as
the initiative in Washington was, although the Court admitted
that had the Proposition employed a racial classification, it
would have been unconstitutional unless necessary to further a
compelling state interest. 10 2
The Court's failing to find a facial racial classification in
Crawford did not end the matter. As the Court indicated in
Washington, a facially neutral statute still may not pass consti-
tutional muster. However, more must be shown if a facially neu-
tral statute is to be held constitutionally infirm. The Crawford
Court explained that "even when a neutral law has a dispropor-
tionately adverse effect on a racial minority, the Fourteenth
Amendment is violated only if a discriminatory purpose can be
shown."10 3 In Crawford, the Court rejected that the voters of the
state had so voted because of a discriminatory purpose 0 4 and,
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
98. Compare Washington, supra note 88 with Crawford, supra note 97 (each case
was argued on March 22, 1982).
99. Compare Washington, supra note 88 with Crawford, supra note 97 (each deci-
sion was announced on June 30, 1982).
100. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 529.
101. Id. at 537.
102. Id. at 536.
103. Id. at 537-38 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 US. 229, 238-48 (1976)).
104. See id. at 545.
1997] 753
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
further, refused to characterize the proposition as anything
more than a mere repeal of existing legislation. 105 In Washing-
ton, the Court had found a discriminatory purpose 06 and had
found that the initiative had been more than a mere repeal. 07
The point here is not to question the particular findings of
fact in each of the cases, for example, whether it was true that
no invidious purpose had been involved in the adoption of the
proposition at issue in Crawford, but to see what conclusions of
law might be inferred from the two cases. The Court's position
seems to be that an initiative or proposition which (1) is neutral
on its face, 05 (2) is a mere repeal or recision, 10 9 and (3) is not in-
vidiously motivated," 0 passes constitutional muster as long as
no federal guarantees are violated."'
Comparing Hunter v. Erickson"2 with James v. Valtierra"3
will also help to clarify the jurisprudence in this area. In James,
the Court considered an amendment to the state constitution
which provided that "no low-rent housing project should be de-
veloped, constructed, or acquired in any manner by a state pub-
lic body until the project was approved by a majority of those
voting at a community election."114 The Court not only described
this amendment as facially neutral but also held that it was not
aimed at a racial minority," 5 thereby distinguishing it from
Hunter which rested on distinctions based on race." 6
In Hunter, the ordinance distinguished between those
groups who sought protection against "racial, religious, or ances-
tral discrimination in the sale and rental of real estate"" 7 from
those who sought regulations regarding property transactions in
105. See id., at 539-40.
106. See Washington, 458 U.S. at 471.
107. See id. at 483.
108. Compare Crawford, 458 U.S. at 537 (the case appears neutral) with Washing-
ton, 458 US. at 471 (the case appears neutral).
109. Compare Crawford, 458 U.S. at 539-40 (implying that the proposition is a mere
repeal) with Washington, 458 U.S. at 483 (the proposition is more than a mere repeal).
110. Compare Crawford, 458 U.S. at 545 (not invidiously motivated) with Washing-
ton, 458 U.S. at 485-86 (invidiously motivated).
111. Compare Crawford, 458 U.S. at 535 (meets and indeed adopts Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees) with Washington, 458 U.S. at 487 (Fourteenth Amendment
violated).
112. 393 U.S. 385 (1969); See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text for further
discussion of this case.
113. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
114. Id. at 139.
115. See id. at 141.
116. See id.
117. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390.
754 [Vol. 45
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
the "pursuit of other ends."118 The Hunter Court found the ordi-
nance's impact would be on minorities seeking protection," 9
whereas the James Court offered no suggestion that racial mi-
norities in particular had an extra burden as a result of the
amendment.'2 0
Certainly, it might be suggested that the referendum at is-
sue in James was not aimed at a particular racial class but in-
stead was aimed at a particular economic class, singling them
out for special disadvantageous treatment,'2 1 since the referen-
dum concerned the conditions under which low-rent housing
projects might be constructed. 2 2 However, the Court rejected
this analysis, suggesting that an "examination of California law
reveals that persons advocating low-income housing have not
been singled out for mandatory referendums," 2 3 and pointing
out that referenda were required in a variety of contexts having
nothing to do with the relative wealth of the groups or individu-
als that might be affected.24
When the constitutionality of a facially neutral statute is at
issue, the measure may be at risk unless proponents convince
the Court that no particular group had been selected for adverse
treatment. In Washington, the Court suggested that one of the
fatal weaknesses of the amendment at issue was that race-
related busing was subjected to requirements to which other
kinds of busing would not be subjected2 5 Further, in Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections,'26 the Court struck down a poll tax
precisely because it was aimed at those with little wealth2
7
In Reitman v. Mulkey, m the Court considered a ballot initi-
ative which would have protected the right of any private per-
son who was considering selling, leasing, or renting property, to
decline to do so to "such person or persons as he, in his absolute
118. Id.
119. Id. at 391.
120. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) ("The article requires referen-
dum approval for any low-rent public housing project, not only for projects which will be
occupied by a racial minority.").
121. See id. at 144 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ('The article explicitly singles out low-
income persons to bear its burden.').
122. See id. at 139.
123. See id. at 142.
124. See id.
125. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 US. 457, 487 (1982).
126. 383 US. 663 (1966).
127. Id. at 666 ([A] State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an elec-
toral standard.).
128. 387 US. 369 (1967).
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discretion, chooses."12 9 The United States Supreme Court upheld
the California Supreme Court's striking the statute, agreeing
with the state court's determination that the amendment at is-
sue "would and did have wider impact than a mere repeal of ex-
isting statutes."130 The California court had concluded that a
"prohibited state involvement could be found 'even where the
state can be charged with only encouraging,' rather than com-
manding discrimination."13'
Just as the Court had worried in Reitman that the amend-
ment would encourage additional discrimination, the amend-
ment in Hawaii might do the same. To include within the state
constitution an explicit provision that the legislature would be
allowed to impose a limitation on same-sex couples which is not
imposed on other couples might induce individuals to believe
that other kinds of discrimination against same-sex couples
would also be permissible. If the state constitution allows the
legislature to deprive individuals of something as fundamental
as the right to marry, 32 then it might be argued that the legis-
lature is obviously empowered to restrict other nonfundamental
rights.3 3 Further, arguably, this will encourage private individu-
als to engage in discriminatory activities just as the California
Supreme Court found would occur were the ballot issue ex-
amined in Reitman upheld.
In Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court,13 a
California appellate court examined the constitutionality of a
proposed ordinance which would have repealed existing ordi-
nances protecting "homosexuals and those infected with the HIV
virus."135 The proposed ordinance would further require that any
future ordinances prohibiting such discrimination would have to
be submitted to the voters for approval. 36 The court explained
that "under the proposed ordinance, persons seeking protective
129. Id. at 371.
130. Id. at 376.
131. Id. at 375; see also Bruce, supra note 85, at 455-456 ("[Ihe Court affi-med a
lower court ruling that Proposition Fourteen unconstitutionally involved the State of
California in private discrimination. States cannot, without running afoul of the Consti-
tution, authorize conduct that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if engaged in
directly by government.").
132. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US. 374 (1978) (right to marry is fundamental).
133. But see Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996) ("By requiring that the
classification bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative
end, we ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the
group burdened by the law.").
134. 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 648 (Ct. App. 1991).




legislation against discrimination based on sexual orientation or
AIDS must attempt to persuade a majority of the voters that
such an ordinance is desirable," 13 7 noting that this arrangement
was strikingly similar to that which was struck down in
Hunter. 38
The proposed ordinance at issue in Citizens for Responsible
Behavior was a response to the city council's having already
passed ordinances and resolutions prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation or HIV status. 3 9 The court re-
fused to characterize the proposed ordinance as a mere repeal,
instead suggesting that the ordinance would be an "implicit af-
firmance of the right of all persons to discriminate as they
choose against the affected classes."140 Indeed, the court held
that the ordinance was plainly designed to encourage discrimi-
nation.'4 ' Because the ordinance was not a mere repeal but
would in addition encourage discrimination, the appellate court
held it unconstitutional.
Not only has the Supreme Court suggested that proposed
ordinances or propositions which are intended to promote dis-
crimination are unconstitutional, but the Court has also indi-
cated its misgivings about the constitutionality of propositions
which will prevent various state actors from rectifying discrimi-
nation against minorities. In Reitman, the Court worried that by
including the "right to discriminate"' within "the State's basic
charter, 4 the right to discriminate was immune from "execu-
tive or judicial regulation at any level of the state govern-
ment."1 In Romer, the Court also worried that the amendment
at issue would prohibit all legislative, executive, or judicial ac-
tion at the state level which was aimed to protect gays and
lesbians.1'
Should voters approve the proposed amendment in Hawaii,
a right to discriminate would have been included in the state
charter. Limitations would be placed on the judicial branches at
the state level, since courts could no longer maintain that a dis-
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 657.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 377 (1969).
143. Id.; but see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964) ("With respect to the op-
eration of the Equal Protection Clause, it makes no difference whether a State's appor-
tionment scheme is embodied in its constitution or in statutory provisions".).
144. Reitman, 387 US. at 377.
145. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996).
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crete, identifiable group was being deprived of the equal protec-
tion guarantees of the state constitution by being denied the
right to marry.146 The amendment's imposing this limitation
might itself be enough to establish its constitutional impermissi-
bility, although the amendment would seem to have even more
serious flaws, depending upon how it is construed.
H. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
To determine the kinds of effects that a particular amend-
ment will have, one must know how it will be construed by the
courts. As suggested above, it may matter, for example, whether
an amendment will be construed to permit or encourage dis-
crimination rather than merely to repeal a statute. 47 An addi-
tional element for consideration is that it will matter which
court will be construing the amendment. Because the issue
under discussion here involves a state constitutional amend-
ment, the Hawaii Supreme Court's construction will be consid-
ered definitive or, at the very least, will be given great
deference.
A. Deference to State Courts
The Supreme Court has consistently held that "only state
courts may authoritatively construe state statutes." 48 Thus,
when the Supreme Court must decide whether a particular
state statute violates federal constitutional guarantees, the
Court will defer to the state supreme court's construction of that
statute rather than impose its own interpretation.
Suppose that there are several possible interpretations of a
state amendment or statute. Even if the United States Supreme
Court would have offered a different interpretation than was of-
fered by the state supreme court, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized that it is not the Court's function to "con-
strue a state statute contrary to the construction given it by the
highest court of a State."149 This is true even if, as construed,
146. See supra notes 29-54 and accompanying text (discussing import of amend-
ment's being directed at a discrete, identifiable group).
147. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of an
amendment's being held to be more than a mere repeal).
148. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1600 (1996).
149. O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974); see also Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518, 520 (1972) ("Only the Georgia courts can supply the requisite construction,
since of course 'we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation.' ?") (citing
United States v. Thirty-seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971)).
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the statute or amendment violates Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees. 150 Of course, the Supreme Court will strike down
such a statute, but that is a different matter which simply does
not speak to whose construction must be accepted.151
Almost 150 years ago, the Court made clear in Nesmith v.
Sheldon 52 that it would adopt and follow the decisions of the
state high courts in the "construction of their own constitution
and statutes.' 53 The Court has refused to distinguish between
statutes and constitutional provisions-in either event, the high
court of the state is to offer the authoritative construction.
54
Thus, whether the Supreme Court of Hawaii will be construing
the proposed amendment or will be construing a statute passed
by the legislature which reserves marriage for opposite-sex
couples, the United States Supreme Court should defer to the
construction offered by the Hawaii Supreme Court.
In Rowan v. Runnels,'155 the Court wrote that it "will always
feel itself bound to respect the decisions of the State courts, and
from the time they are made will regard them as conclusive in
all cases upon the construction of their own constitution and
laws."'156 The Court will view the construction offered by the
state's highest court as if it were part of the statute or amend-
ment under examination and will consider that construction just
as binding as the text. 57 Indeed, the Court will accept the state
supreme court's interpretation of the meaning of the statute as
though that meaning had been specifically expressed within the
statute itself.5 8
In Groves v. Slaughter,59 the Supreme Court made clear
that it would defer to the state supreme court as long as "there
has been such a fixed and settled construction given to the con-
stitution as to preclude this court from considering it an open
150. O'Brien, 414 U.S. at 531.
151. See infra notes 165-172 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's reserv-
ing the power to decide whether a statute or amendment, as authoritatively construed,
passes constitutional muster).
152. 48 U.S. 812 (1849).
153. Id. at 818.
154. Webster v. Cooper, 55 U.S. 488, 504 (1852) ("there is no sound distinction be-
tween the construction of a law enacted by the legislature of a State, and the construc-
tion of the organic law, ordained by the people themselves. The exposition of both be-
longs to the judicial department of the government of the State, and its decision is
final.").
155. 46 US. 134 (1847).
156. Id. at 139.
157. See Leffingwell v. Warren, 67 US. 599, 603 (1862).
158. Supreme Lodge, KL P. v. Meyer, 265 U.S. 30, 32 (1924).
159. 40 US. 449 (1841).
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question." 160 That deference will be accorded, even should the
Court doubt the interpretation's correctness. 161 For example, nor-
mally, "if a statute will bear two constructions, one within and
the other beyond the constitutional power of the law-making
body, the courts should adopt that which is consistent with the
Constitution, because it is to be presumed that the legislature
intended to act within the scope of its authority."162 Suppose,
however, that a state supreme court offers an interpretation of a
statute which entails that the legislature had exceeded its
power. The normal presumption would be trumped by the re-
quirement that the United States Supreme Court defer, and the
state supreme court's interpretation would be accepted.
The point here is not that citizens have no recourse once
their supreme court offers an interpretation of the state consti-
tution. On the contrary, the Supreme Court made clear in Web-
ster v. Cooper'6s that it would defer to the state high court's ex-
position of both state statutes and the state constitution until
the people saw fit to change their constitution. 164 The only re-
quirements which must be met when the state constitution is
changed are that the appropriate procedures be followed and
that federal guarantees not be violated.
B. Federal Protections
By adopting this deferential attitude toward the highest
state court with respect to the construction of the state statutes
and constitution, the Court is not thereby ceding all authority.
In Storaasli v. Minnesota,165 the Court explained that although
"bound by the state court's decision as to the meaning and ap-
plication of the law," the Court would decide for itself "whether
as applied to the appellant it affects his constitutional rights."166
The Court is thus striking a balance, deferring to the state
courts in their area of expertise but reserving the right to make
its own decisions about the federal constitution's protections.
The Court explained in Chapman v. California167 that it could
not "leave to the States the formulation of the authoritative
160. Id. at 497.
161. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. 152, 165 (1825).
162. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Arkansas ex rel. Norwood, 235 US. 350,
369 (1914).
163. 55 U.S. 488 (1852).
164. Id. at 504
165. 283 US. 57 (1931).
166. Id. at 62.
167. 386 US. 18 (1967).
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laws, rules, and remedies designed toprotect people from infrac-
tions by the States of federally guaranteed rights."168
The Court's reserving this power cuts both ways. The Court
would neither defer to a state supreme court's judgment that a
statute was permitted by the United States Constitution nor
that a statute was prohibited by that constitution. If a state su-
preme court strikes a state statute on federal constitutional
grounds, the United States Supreme Court can review that
judgment, even if, for example, the state high court might in-
stead have. struck down the statute on state constitutional
grounds.169
Insofar as the proposed amendment to the Hawaii Constitu-
tion is at issue, the Hawaii Supreme Court will not even be con-
sidering whether it is in accord with the state constitution, since
that is the document that is being amended. Rather, the Hawaii
Supreme Court will offer its construction of the "purpose, scope,
and operative effect of a provision of the . . . [State] Constitu-
tion,"70 and then judge the constitutionality of that amendment
in light of federal constitutional guarantees.
One of the issues in Romer was how to construct Amend-
ment 2. The state of Colorado had characterized it as simply de-
nying a particular group "special rights."' 7 ' The Court found this
position implausible, especially given "the authoritative con-
struction of Colorado's Supreme Court," 72 and then upheld the
Colorado Supreme Court's determination that the Amendment
violated the United States Constitution. Assuming that the vot-
ers approve the proposed amendment to the Hawaii Constitu-
tion and that it is challenged in the state courts, the Hawaii Su-
preme Court will give a construction of that amendment, and
then make a judgment about whether it passes federal constitu-
tional muster' If that decision is appealed, the United States Su-
preme Court should defer to the state supreme court's interpre-
tation of the meaning of the amendment but make its own
168. Id. at 21.
169. See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 US. 95, 98 (1938):
Where the state court does not decide against a petitioner or appellant upon
an independent state ground, but deeming the federal question to be before it,
actually entertains and decides that question adversely to the federal right as-
serted, this Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment if, as here, it is a fi-
nal judgment. We cannot refuse jurisdiction because the state court might have
based its decision, consistently with the record, upon an independent and ade-
quate nonfederal ground.
170. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 US. 369, 374 (1966).




determination concerning whether that amendment violates the
Federal Constitution.
III THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
In Baehr v. Lewin, 173 a plurality of the Hawaii Supreme
Court held that the same-sex marriage ban involved a gender
classification both facially and as applied, 174 because it allowed a
man to marry a woman but not a man and it allowed a woman
to marry a man but not a woman.175 Because gender classifica-
tions are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Hawaii Constitution, the state was told that it
would have to establish that the same-sex marriage ban was
narrowly tailored to promote compelling state interests if that
prohibition was to survive constitutional scrutiny.176 The court
then remanded the case to give the state an opportunity to es-
tablish the compelling interests which justified such a distinc-
tion. On remand, the lower court held that the state had failed
to meet its burden.177
Suppose that the citizens of Hawaii approve the amendment
at issue and the legislature passes a law which states that "the
marriage contract... shall be only between a man and a wo-
man."f ' 78 The state supreme court could no longer hold that the
legislature's reserving marriage for opposite-sex couples violated
the Hawaii Constitution. However, the state supreme court
would still have to decide whether the statute classified on the
basis of gender and, if so, whether that classification offended
federal constitutional guarantees. Presumably, the court would
again find that the statute distinguished on the basis of gender,
both facially and as applied. However, this time, the level of
scrutiny to determine whether the classification passed constitu-
tional muster would be lower, since gender is merely a quasi-
suspect classification for federal equal protection purposes. 79
173. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Ha.
1993).
174. See id. at 64.
175. See id. at 60.
176. See id. at 67.
177. See Baehr v. Milke, No. C1V 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996).
178. See HAW. Rsv. STAT. § 572-1 (1994).
179. See Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumber-
ing Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64
FoRDHAm L. REV. 921, 941 (1995) (discussing the difference between the federal and state
levels of scrutiny for gender classifications).
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Further, the United States Supreme Court would be the ulti-
mate arbiter as to whether in fact there has been a constitu-
tional violation.
A. Intermediate Scrutiny
The United States Constitution requires that statutes dis-
criminating on the basis of gender be closely tailored to promote
important state interests.180 In United States v. Virginia,'81 the
Court made clear that it would carefully scrutinize state action
that "closes a door or denies opportunity to women (or to
men)."' 82 The statutory classification "must not rely on over-
broad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females.' 83 Certainly, there are
'[i]nherent differences' between men and women... [which] re-
main cause for celebration." 84 However, these differences are
"not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial
constraints on an individual's opportunity."185 In Hogan, the
Court indicated that the test for determining the validity of a
gender-based classification must be applied "free of fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females."18 6 The
Court has promised that care will be taken in "ascertaining
whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereo-
typic notions."
87
When deciding whether the proposed amendment violates
constitutional guarantees, the Court will first have to determine
whether there is a gender-based classification. That determina-
tion should not be particularly difficult, since the amendment
and the statute which it would authorize would both facially
discriminate on the basis of gender and, further, lest there be
any doubt, the Hawaii Supreme Court would (presumably) al-
ready have held that the statute so discriminated. Express dis-
180. See Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 US. 256. 273 (1979) ("[Gender] classifications
must bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives."
(citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976))); see also Mississippi University for Wo-
men v. Hogan, 458 US. 718, 724 (1982) (The burden is met only by showing at least
that the classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discrimi-
natory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives." (citing Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980))).
181. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
182. Id. at 2275.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2276.
185. Id.
186. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 717, 724-25 (1982).
187. Id. at 725.
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crimination on the basis of gender will trigger heightened scru-
tiny188  and will require an "exceedingly persuasive
justification."1"9
B. Application of the Test
Merely because a statute discriminates on the basis of gen-
der does not establish the constitutional infirmity of that classi-
fication.190 However, the statute will not be upheld if it is based
on false stereotypes or is to promote archaic notions about the
sexes.'9 ' For example, insofar as the claim is that same-sex mar-
riages should be precluded because lesbians and gays cannot be
good parents, that claim has -been empirically disproven and
thus cannot be the basis for such a statute.192 Indeed, insofar as
marriage is important because of the factors that the Supreme
Court specified in Turner v. Safley, 93 for example, that they "are
expressions of emotional support and public-commitment"194 or
because they may involve "an exercise of religious faith as well
as an expression of personal dedication"' 95 or because marriage
is often a "precondition to the receipt of government benefits,"19
marriage would be at least as important for same-sex couples as
for opposite-sex couples. 97
Certainly, there are differences between same-sex and oppo-
site-sex couples. For example, none of the former can have a
child through their union, whereas many of the latter can. How-
ever, since there is no general requirement that couples who
wish to marry be planning on having children, much less chil-
dren through their union,198 it seems clear that this is a mere
188. See id. at 723.
189. Id. at 724.
190. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 US. 464, 469 (1981) ("[T]his Court has
consistently upheld statutes where the gender classification is not invidious, but rather
realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain
circumstances.").
191. See supra notes 183-187 and accompanying text (discussing test for gender-
based classifications).
192. See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996) (re-
jecting state's claim that lesbians and gays are not sufficiently good parents).
193. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
194. Id. at 95.
195. Id. at 96.
196. Id.
197. For further discussion of this and related points, see generally Mark Strasser,
Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumbering Baehr: On Definitional
Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 921
(1995).
198. See id. at 955-62.
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pretense. The state cannot plausibly maintain that it is an im-
portant state interest for those who plan to marry to be able to
have children through their union if they are same-sex partners
but not if they are opposite-sex partners.199 The state of Hawaii
has already made clear that it does not believe that an impor-
tant interest is served by restricting marriage to those able to
have a child through their union, since the legislature took ac-
tion to remove that requirement from its laws.
20 0
Several states have indicated their willingness to allow first
cousins to marry provided that they either are over 65 or can
establish that they cannot have children through their union.
201
These states will also have some difficulty in plausibly claiming
that the purposes of marriage require that the individuals who
wish to marry be able to have a child through their union, since
these states will allow certain couples to marry only if they can-
not do so.
Nor should those states not making this particular first-
cousin exception feel confident that they can easily maintain the
importance of would-be marital couples' being able to produce
children through their union. If indeed this is an important or
compelling state interest, then states will have to explain why
they are willing to ignore that interest when opposite-sex
couples desire to marry. In Louisville Gas and Electric Co. v.
Coleman,20 2 the Supreme Court warned that discriminations of
an unusual character require careful consideration to determine
whether they are "obnoxious" to constitutional guarantees. 2 3 In
Eisenstadt v. Baird,°2 4 the Court pointed out that "nothing opens
the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow... officials
to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legisla-
199. See id. at 955.
200. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 48 n.1 (Haw. 1993); see also Richard D. Mohr,
The Case for Gay Marriage, 9 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHics & PUB. PoLY 215, 223 (1995)
(noting that Hawaii had amended its marriage statute to delete the requirement that
neither of the parties was impotent); Nancy Klingeman, Kenneth May, For Better or
Worse, in Sickness and in Health, until Death Do Us Part: A Look at Same-Sex Marriage
in Hawaii, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 447, 473 n.185 (1994) (discussing marriage statute and
impotency requirement); Erik J. Toulon, Call the Caterer: Hawaii to Host First Same-Sex
Marriage, 3 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN's STuD. 109, 127 (1993) (discussing marriage stat-
ute and impotency requirement).
201. See bIN. CODE ANN. § 31-7-1-3 (West 1979) (addressing the over 65 age limit);
Amz. REv STAT. § 25-101 (1939) (over 65 or one is unable to reproduce); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.03 (West 1979) (female 55 or either submits affidavit permanently sterile); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-1-1 (West 1953) (over 65 or both over 55 and one cannot reproduce).
202. 277 U.S. 32 (1928).
203. See id. at 37.
204. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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tion and thus to escape the political retribution that might be
visited upon them if larger numbers were affected."20 5 When one
considers that this requirement of procreation through the
union of the to-be married individuals is (1) unusual and (2) ap-
plied to only a few who (3) themselves are relatively powerless 2 6
so that it will not be difficult for lawmakers to escape political
retribution by the selective imposition of that requirement, the
classification cries out for close examination.
It is sometimes suggested that allowing same-sex couples to
marry will somehow undermine opposite-sex marriage. 207 Yet,
such an- assertion flies in the face of the empirical evidence 20
and, in any event, other steps would be much more effective if
the State really was interested in protecting the family unit.209
Even were it true that a substantial number of individuals
would choose to marry a same-sex partner rather than an oppo-
site-sex partner, this would hardly justify the prohibition. One
could imagine the response to the claim that interracial couples
should not be allowed to marry because, otherwise, the in-
traracial marriage rate would go down.210
Perhaps it will be argued that there is no invidious discrim-
ination on the basis of gender. Men are not allowed to do any-
thing that women are prohibited from doing, and vice versa,
since neither is allowed to marry anyone of the same sex. In
Pace v. Alabama,211 the Supreme Court used similar reasoning
when upholding Alabama's punishing interracial fornication
more severely than intraracial fornication. That Court had rea-
soned that because both whites and blacks would be subjected
to the same penalty for violating the antimiscegenation statute,
205. Id. at 454.
206. For a discussion of the relative powerlessness of lesbians, gays, and bisexuals
compared to other groups that have been held to be suspect or quasi-suspect, see Mark
Strasser, Unconstitutional? Don't Ask; If It Is, Don't Tell: On Deference, Rationality, and
the Constitution, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 375, 407-411 (1995).
207. Cf. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1347 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (noting defend-
ants' suggestion that prohibiting discrimination against lesbians and gays will under-
mine marriage).
208. Id.
209. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati Inc v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F.
Supp. 417, 442 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd and vacated, 1997 WL 656228 (6th Cir. 1997)
(heterosexual males are far more responsible than gays for the breakdown of the family
unit).
210. See Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Antimis-
cegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L Rmv. 981, 994 (1991) (discussing the speciousness
of such an argument).
211. 106 US. 583 (1883).
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there was no constitutional violation.21 However, as the Court
explained in McLaughlin v. Florida,213 Pace represents a limited
view of the Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood
analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court."214
McLaughlin also involved an antimiscegenation statute in
which interracial fornication was subjected to a more severe
penalty than was intraracial fornication.215 The McLaughlin
Court noted that "all whites and Negroes who engage in the for-
bidden conduct are covered by the section and each member of
the interracial couple is subject to the same penalty."21 6 How-
ever, as the Court had already explained in Carrington v.
Rash,2 17 the fact that a "State is dealing with a distinct class
and treats the members of that class equally does not end the
judicial inquiry."218 So, too, the McLaughlin Court explained,
"Judicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause ... does
not end with a showing of equal application among the members
of the class defined by the legislation."21 9 There is a further
question, namely, "whether the classifications drawn in a stat-
ute are reasonable in light of its purpose."220 The McLaughlin
Court had to decide "whether there... [was] an arbitrary or in-
vidious discrimination between those classes covered by Flor-
ida's cohabitation law and those excluded,"2 1 and concluded that
the distinction in the Florida law involved invidious
discrimination.22
2
If certain individuals must establish that they can produce
a child through their union before they can marry but no one
else has to meet that test, there is at the very least a question
whether that requirement is reasonable in light of the purposes
of marriage. If in addition this requirement is only imposed on a
discrete, disfavored group, it is hard to see how the Court could
find that this was not an arbitrary and invidious classifica-
tion.223 By the same token, if certain people are to be barred
212. See id. at 585.
213. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
214. Id. at 188.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
218. Id. at 93.
219. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 191.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 195.




from marrying because they cannot be good parents when (1)
there is ample evidence that they are good parents,224 and other
couples do not have the requirement imposed when they wish to
marry,225 it is difficult to see how the Court could uphold the re-
quirement as noninvidious.
In Loving v. Virginia, 26 the Court examined the constitu-
tionality of Virginia's antimiscegenation statute. When arguing
for the constitutionality of that statute, the State of Virginia
suggested that "because its miscegenation statutes punish
equally both the white and the Negro participants in an interra-
cial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial
classifications do not constitute an invidious discrimination
based upon race."227 However, the Supreme Court rejected that
mere equal application was enough to meet the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirements and struck down Virginia's prohibi-
tion of interracial marriage.228
In Palmore v. Sidoti,229 the Court noted, "Classifying persons
according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice
than legitimate public concerns; the race, not the person, dic-
tates the category."230 The Court understood that it was unable
to eradicate attitudes of racial prejudice but nonetheless held
that the Constitution could not "tolerate" them,231 making clear
that "the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."232
So, too, although it may be impossible for the State to eradicate
private biases against lesbian, bisexual, and gay people, the
State should neither tolerate such attitudes nor allow the law to
give them effect, either directly or indirectly.
Insofar as the Hawaii Legislature would be passing the
same-sex marriage ban to prevent lesbians or gays from mar-
rying their same-sex partners, the state would be using a forbid-
den classification (gender) in an overbroad way to penalize an
identifiable group.2 3 Of course, it is not clear that the legisla-
224. See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 3 1996) (rejecting state's claim that lesbians and gays are not sufficiently good
parents).
225. Cf. supra notes 192-206 and accompanying text (discussing unequal application
of relevant criteria).
226. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
227. Id. at 8.
228. Id.
229. 466 US. 429 (1984).
230. Id. at 432.
231. Id. at 433.
232. Id.
233. See Craig M. Bradley, The Right Not to Endorse Gay Rights: A Reply to Sun.
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ture's aim would be to preclude only those with a same-sex ori-
entation from marrying. To determine that, the relevant ques-
tion would be whether the legislature would permit two
heterosexual individuals of the same sex to marry, for example,
because they wanted to secure some of the benefits of
marriage2
4
Currently, Hawaii allows individuals not permitted to
marry to get some of the possible benefits of marriage by regis-
tering as reciprocal beneficiaries. 2 5 However, this would not en-
title them to all of the possible benefits,236 and thus the question
at hand is whether the Legislature would be willing to allow
these two heterosexuals to marry to secure some of the benefits
that they otherwise would not be entitled to have.
237
If the answer is 'No', then the state might seem to have
closely tailored its marriage statute, since the state intends to
prevent all individuals of the same sex, regardless of their sex-
ual orientation, from marrying. However, it still would not be
clear that the statute was sufficiently closely tailored. If the
purported reason to prevent people of the same sex (regardless
of orientation) from marrying was that they were unable to pro-
duce children through their union, but the state allowed oppo-
site-sex couples to marry who could not reproduce through their
union, then the statute still would not be sufficiertly closely
tailored.
It would not suffice for the state to claim in response that it
would be too difficult to make people prove that they could
reproduce or, perhaps, to respond that the state's imposing such
a requirement would invade an area of privacy protected by the
Constitution.238 Apparently, imposing such a requirement does
stein, 70 IND. L.J. 29, 34 (1994) ("A ban on same-sex marriages is not perfectly tailored to
further the governmental interest in not giving homosexual relationships legal recogni-
tion since it forbids people of the same sex from entering into a legally recognized 'mar-
riage' regardless of their sexual proclivities (or lack of same)").
234. See Sondrea Joy King, Note, Ya'll Can't Do That Here: Will Texas Recognize
Same-Sex Marriages Validly Contracted in Other States?, 2 TEx. WEsLEYAN L. Rv. 515,
551 (1996) (posing hypothetical of two heterosexual women who wish to marry for eco-
nomic benefits).
235. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing reciprocal beneficiary
statute).
236. See Baer v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 560-61 (Haw. 1993) (listing some of those
benefits).
237. See MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTrrUTION
(1997) 18-22 (discussing adult adoptions where adults will sometimes adopt other adults
to achieve economic or social objectives, even if the adopter and adoptee have no sexual
interest in each other).
238. See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 1980) aff'd, 673
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not pose insurmountable constitutional or practical difficulties,
since some states already require that individuals prove that
they cannot reproduce before they will be allowed to marry their
would-be marital partners.239 Thus, it is clear that these reasons
not to impose such a requirement on opposite-sex couples are
specious. Presumably, the fear is that were such a requirement
imposed on all couples, it would not be possible to escape the
political retribution which would result from the imposition of
such an irrational policy.2 4
Suppose that the state would be willing to allow two heter-
osexuals of the same sex to marry if only there were a good way
to establish that the individuals were indeed heterosexual. The
state would then have adopted an overinclusive gender classifi-
cation in its marriage statute as a way of intentionally dis-
advantaging a discrete, identifiable group. The statute would
then be even more constitutionally offensive than it otherwise
would have been.
Regardless of whether the state would allow two heterosex-
uals of the same sex to marry, however, the state would still
have to show what important interests were served by this gen-
der classification. At least on its face, this classification is ex-
actly the kind of classification that heightened scrutiny is de-
signed to discover and disallow.
C. Orientation Discrimination
Suppose that it were rejected that the proposed Hawaii
amendment was gender-based, the Hawaii Supreme Court's
finding notwithstanding. It still would not be clear that the
amendment would pass constitutional muster, notwithstanding
that when using the rational basis test the Court must sustain
a legislative classification "if the classification itself is rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest."2 41
Romer was decided using a rational basis test.2 42 The
F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982), and cert denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982). (suggesting that such a
requirement would raise serious privacy concerns).
239. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing some states' first-cousin
marriage requirements).
240. The claim here of course is that this requirement should be imposed on no
couples rather than on all couples.
241. United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 US. 528, 533 (1973).
242. Courtney G. Joslin, Recent Development, Equal Protection and Anti-Gay Legis-
lation: Dismantling the Legacy of Bowers v. Hardwick-Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996), 32 HARV. C.-C.L. L. REV. 225, 236 (1997) (discussing Romer's use of "the defer-
ential rational basis test").
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amendment was struck, at least in part, because it was designed
to make lesbians and gays second-class citizens-the amend-
ment was designed to make them "unequal to everyone else."M
This is something which the Constitution will not permit. As a
California appellate court pointed out, the Equal Protection
Clause applies to "all citizens, not only those in traditionally
'suspect' classes,"2 4-lesbians, bisexuals, and gays are also enti-
tled to the equal protection of the laws.245 Indeed, the "United
States Constitution forbids any effort to discriminate against a
discrete group."
246
It would be instructive to examine how the Court might
find that the Hawaii same-sex marriage ban did not discrimi-
nate on the basis of gender, facial classification notwithstanding.
Perhaps the Court would hold that the definition of marriage
entails that only opposite-sex couples can marry.2 4 7 However,
there are clear difficulties with that view.
As a general matter, if equal protection scrutiny can be
avoided by adopting definitions, then it would seem that states
could go back to prohibiting interracial marriages by simply de-
fining marriage as a union involving individuals of the same
race.248 This is something which the Constitution simply would
not permit.
It might be suggested that the argument that same-sex
couples are precluded by definition from marrying is not under-
mined by the analogy to interracial marriage because the com-
parison is inapt.249 Arguably, interracial marriages should be
understood to fall within the category of "traditional" mar-
243. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996).
244. Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. State, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 654 (1991).
245. Id.; See also Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (en banc) ("[Tihe
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution applies to all citizens, and not
simply those who are members of traditionally 'suspect' classes such as racial or ethnic
minorities." (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886))).
246. Citizens for Responsible Behavior, 2 Cal.Rptr. at 654.
247. Several courts have made this suggestion. See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F.
Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (concept of marriage requires individuals of different
sexes); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185-86 n.1 (Minn. 1971) (marriage can only be
between individuals of different sexes); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Wash.
App. 1974) (only people of the opposite-sex may marry); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d
588, 590 (Ky. 1973) (allowing only opposite-sex marriage).
248. See Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Antimis-
cegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L REv. 981, 985-86 (1991) (discussing definitional
preclusion argument); see also MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
THE CoNsrmyTON (1997), Ch. 1.
249. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 441, 588 (1993) (Heen J., dissenting).
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riages, 250 whereas same-sex marriages should not be so under-
stood.251 Yet, it is clear that many did not view interracial mar-
riages as falling within the traditional limitations of marriage.
252
Indeed, it was only about thirty years ago that the Court struck
down antimiscegenation laws in Loving v. Virginia2 3 and, fur-
ther, the Court refused to strike down Virginia's antimiscegena-
tion law about forty years ago.
254
Notwithstanding the relative recency of the Court's having
found that antimiscegenation laws violate constitutional guaran-
tees, Justice Scalia has suggested that interracial marriage bans
are clearly unconstitutional, since the text of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause "explicitly establishes racial equality as a constitu-
tional value."255 Yet, the text is somewhat different than one
might infer from Justice Scalia's comments, since the Four-
teenth Amendment reads, "No State shall ... deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
256
While the text itself suggests that individuals cannot be de-
nied equal treatment because of their race, there is no sugges-
tion that the amendment is limited to preserving racial equality.
250. Donald L." Beschle, Defining the Scope of the Constitutional Right to Marry:
More than Tradition, Less than Unlimited Autonomy, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 39, 64
(1994) (suggesting that the Court's recognizing the right to marry an interracial partner
should be understood as the Court's recognizing a "right to be free of obstacles to enter-
ing a traditional marriage).
251. But see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMIT-
MENT: THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE Ch. 2 (1996) (discussing the history of same-sex
marriages).
252. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (discussing the trial court's view
that interracial marriages violated God's plan). Some courts believed that the state's
power to prevent interracial marriage was of great importance. See State v. Gibson, 36
Ind. 389, 403 (1871) ("The right, in the states, to regulate and control, to guard, protect,
and preserve this God-given, civilizing, and Christianizing institution is of inestimable
importance, and cannot be surrendered, nor can the states suffer or permit any interfer-
ence therewith.).
253. The case was decided in 1967.
254. Naim v. Naim, 350 US. 891 (1955) (the Court refused to strike down Virginia's
antimiscegenation law, instead remanding for a fuller record); see also Naim v. Naim,
350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956) (in which the Court refused to rehear the case because it was
allegedly "devoid of a properly presented federal question.!). The Court even refused to
strike down antimiscegenation laws in 1964. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 US. 184,
195 (1964), where the court refused to reach
the question of the validity of the State's prohibition against interracial mar-
riage... For even if we posit the constitutionality of the ban against the mar-
riage of a Negro and a white, it does not follow that the cohabitation law is not
to be subjected to independent examination under the Fourteenth Amendment.
255. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
980 n.1 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
256. U.S. CONsT. amend XV.
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Further, the Supreme Court wrote in Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia25 that the Fourteenth Amendment precludes arbitrary and
irrational classification that might lead to "inequality of legal
protection, either for life, liberty, or property 258 without explic-
itly limiting the protections of that provision to those who had
been subjected to slavery or even to those discriminated against
on the basis of race. The Strauder Court pointed out that a law
which arbitrarily precludes "all naturalized Celtic Irishmen"
from some benefit would clearly be inconsistent "with the spirit
of the [fourteenth] amendment."259 As the Supreme Court sug-
gested in The Slaughterhouse Cases,260 if rights "are assailed by
the States which properly and necessarily fall within ... [the
Civil War Amendments], that protection will apply, though the
party interested may not be of African descent."261
Historically, the issue for courts confronting whether the
Constitution prohibits antimiscegenation laws was whether mar-
riage itself was protected by the United States Constitution. As
Justice Stewart suggested in his Zablocki concurrence, "The
Constitution does not specifically mention [the] freedom to
marry."262 Various courts have held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not preclude states from enforcing antimiscegenation
laws,2 63 and it was not until 1967 in Loving v. Virginia that the
Supreme Court was willing to contradict that claim.
If Justice Scalia is willing to suggest that Loving was
rightly decided despite the Fourteenth Amendment text's not be-
ing explicitly limited to race and despite the absence of an ex-
plicit constitutional provision protecting the right to marry,264
then his comments would suggest that the right to marry a
same-sex partner might also be protected. Of course, judging
from his comments in Romer,265 it is clear that he would not
257. 100 us. 303 (1879).
258. Id. at 310.
259. Id. at 308.
260. 83 US. 36 (1873).
261. Id. at 72.
262. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US. 374, 392 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment).
263. See Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955) (upholding antiniscegenation
law); Ex parte Kinney, 14 Fed. Cas. 602, 603 (Case No. 7,825) (E.D. Va. 1879) ("there is
nothing in the national constitution expressly forbidding a state from abridging the right
of marrying").
264. But see Planned Parenthood of Southwestern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 US.
833, 980 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (there is no fundamental right if "(1) the
Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of
American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed.").
265. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing Scalia's dissent in
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find such a right, implications of his own position
notwithstanding.
66
Bracketing general claims about the appropriate definition
of marriage, the precluded-by-definition argument would be ut-
terly implausible in the context of a case challenging the amend-
ment to the Hawaii Constitution. If the Hawaii Supreme Court
rules as expected in Miike, the state will recognize same-sex
marriages unless the proposed amendment is adopted. Thus, not
only will same-sex unions not be definitionally precluded, they
will be legally recognized as long as either the amendment does
not pass or the constitutionality of the amendment is not up-
held. The very possibility that such marriages will be recognized
should lay to rest the definitional preclusion argument.26 7 A sep-
arate issue is whether the same-sex marriage prohibition would
be sufficiently closely tailored to sufficiently important interests
to withstand constitutional analysis, but that involves an exami-
nation and weighing of the individual and state interests at is-
sue, and can only be broached once the definitional preclusion
argument has been rejected.
In his concurrence in Zablocki v. Redhail,268 Justice Powell
suggested that by recognizing the fundamental right to marry,
the Court would have to reevaluate its analysis of the state's
traditional power to regulate marriage, including the state's
power to preclude same-sex marriages.269 At least implicitly, he
recognized that an appeal to definitions would not resolve the
relevant issues.
At least one of the lessons of Romer is that even discrimina-
tion against lesbians, bisexuals, and gays is not constitutionally
permissible, absent a legitimate basis for the classification.
270
Romer).
266. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Pressure of Precedent: A Critique of the Conserva-
tive Approaches to Stare Decisis in Abortion Cases, 10 CONST. COMENT. 67, 79-80 (1993)
(suggesting that Justice Scalia's position is neither credible nor consistent).
267. See Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumber-
ing Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64
FORDHAMi L. Rav. 921, 928 (1995) (Baehr v. Lewin establishes the inapplicability of the
definitional preclusion argument to this issue).
268. 434 US. 374 (1978).
269. See id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) ("State regulation has
included bans on incest, bigamy, and homosexuality, as well as various preconditions to
marriage, such as blood tests .... A 'compelling state purpose' inquiry would cast doubt
on the network of restrictions that the States have fashioned to govern marriage and
divorce.").
270. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1126 (11th Cir.) (Birch, Circuit J., dissenting)
reh'g denied 120 F3d 211 ("The import of Romer... is to elucidate what the Supreme
Court considers not to be a rational basis for discrimination against homosexuals.").
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The Supreme Court explained in Reed v. Reed,271 even before it
had developed its intermediate scrutiny analysis, that the Equal
Protection Clause denies states "the power to legislate that dif-
ferent treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the
objective of that statute. 272 If indeed marriage is only for those
who can reproduce through their union or only for those who
can parent well, then the state must enforce the relevant re-
quirements generally and in an equal-handed manner. Were the
state to impose the latter requirement generally, it would allow
some same-sex partners to marry but prohibit some (otherwise
qualified) opposite-sex couples from marrying. The requirement
that would-be marital partners be able or willing to have or
raise children should not be imposed on anyone, much less on a
select group as a pretext to prevent their ability to marry.
In United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno,273 the Court
noted that "if the constitutional conception of 'equal protection
of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that
a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."
274
So, too, a bare desire on the part of a populace or legislature to
disadvantage a traditionally disfavored group cannot be a legiti-
mate state interest.
In Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,275 the Court in-
dicated that it was not confined to "historic notions of equal-
ity"276 when "determining what lines are unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory."277 Just as the Court's previous refusal to strike
down antimiscegenation laws did not require it to side with the
state in Loving v. Virginia, the Court's previous refusal to take
seriously that lesbians, gays, and bisexuals are protected by the
Constitution in Bowers v. Hardwick278 does not require it to ig-
nore its duty now.
279
271. 404 US. 71 (1971).
272. Id. at 75-76
273. 413 US. 528 (1973).
274. Id. at 534.
275. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
276. Id. at 669.
277. Id.
278. 478 US. 186 (1986).
279. See Bowers, 478 US. at 200-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (commenting that the
majority decision upheld Georgia's sodomy law in a decision that "distorted the question
the case present[edi," and likely involved "willful blindness" on the part of the majority);
See Nat Hentoff, A Landmark Lesbian Wedding, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 6, 1996 at 8
(discussing Justice Lewis Powelrs admission that he probably made a mistake in Bowers
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Certainly, the Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude
states from treating "different classes of persons in different
ways."28 0 However, as the Court pointed out in Mugler v. Kan-
sas2 1 over 100 years ago, "It does not at all follow that every
statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of these ends is to
be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police powers of the
state. There are . . . limits beyond which legislation cannot
rightfully go."2 2 Indeed, that Court suggested that if a "statute
purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the
public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial re-
lation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights se-
cured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so
adjudge, and thereby give effect to the constitution."283 The
Court must give effect to the Constitution by striking down this
palpably unconstitutional prohibition.
CONCLUSION
If indeed the Hawaii Supreme Court affirms Baehr v. Mi-
ike,28 Hawaii will have to recognize same-sex marriages unless
their constitution is amended. In November of 1998, the citizens
of Hawaii will have the opportunity to vote whether to allow the
state legislature to reserve marriage for opposite-sex couples.
Even should the proposed amendment garner the requisite num-
ber of votes, that will not end the matter. Such an amendment
would clearly be aimed to deprive a discrete, disfavored group of
a right that is guaranteed under the state constitution. Further,
the amendment and the statute which it would authorize would
involve a facial gender classification. Not only has there been no
showing that such a classification is closely tailored to promote
important state interests, the interests themselves have thus far
not been articulated in a way that can be "credited
285
The Romer Court held that states are not allowed to create
classifications just to establish the inequality of gays and lesbi-
ans.2 86 Yet, that is exactly what the proposed Hawaii amend-
ment would do. The state has decided to afford many of the fi-
nancial benefits of marriage to same-sex couples in the hope
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that the emotional, religious, and symbolic aspects of marriage
would not also need to be extended. Many of the purportedly
compelling interests justifying the same-sex marriage ban have
been shown to be pretextual. The proposed amendment is sim-
ply a way to deprive a particular group of a very important
right which most take for granted and which this group would
enjoy but for the amendment.
The Hawaii Supreme Court already has held that the same-
sex marriage ban discriminates on the basis of gender, both
facially and as applied. Presumably, it will so hold again should
the issue be presented. If the Supreme Court must decide the
constitutionality of Hawaii's same-sex marriage ban, it should
defer to the Hawaii Supreme Court's construction of the statute
or amendment, but decide for itself whether the challenged clas-
sification passes intermediate scrutiny.
It would strain credulity were the Court to employ height-
ened scrutiny and uphold such a classification. The proposed
amendment in Hawaii and the legislation it authorizes should
not be upheld using a rational basis test, much less a higher
level of scrutiny,287 since they involve exactly the kind of stigma-
tization and unequal treatment that the Equal Protection
Clause is designed to prevent. If the proposed Hawaii amend-
ment does not provide an example of amending a state constitu-
tion to impose a badge of inequality and second-class citizenship
on a discrete group, then it is not clear what would qualify.
287. For a discussion of the different levels of constitutional scrutiny, see generally
Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating, Unwit-
tingly or Otherwise, 64 TEmiPLE L. Ray. 937 (1991).
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